Zhuangzi and Mozi: The Ontological Difference
Heidegger, Zhuangzi, Mozi and the Ontological Difference
Almost all of the schools of ancient Chinese thought placed significance on the term “Dao.” Yet, these schools of thought fundamentally differed on what the meaning of the Dao actually is. Such is the case between Taoism and Mohism. This essay intends to compare these two disparate conceptions of the Dao in a new light: a light that will attempt to draw an explicit line between these two conceptions. Specifically, this essay will contend that the difference here can be characterized by Martin Heidegger’s notion of the “ontological- difference.” Namely, that the Dao for Taoists is wrapped up in concerns with Being (which, ultimately means a concern with beings in terms of their Being), whereas the Dao for the Mohists is wrapped up in beings (a conception which ignores the Being of beings.) The former conception of the Dao, being akin to Heideggerian phenomenology, and the latter conception of the Dao, being the antithesis to Heideggerian phenomenology. In section 1, I will explain what it is that the Taoists mean by the Dao, insofar as Zhuangzi understands it. In this section, I will utilize Heidegger’s notion of Being-in-the-world to help unpack this conception of the Dao, for these are, in certain respects, almost identical notions. In section 2, I will explain what it is…
