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The Fallaciousness of Conceivability Arguments
Why the zombie argument obscures investigations into the nature of consciousness
Scientifically, a zombie apocalypse like the ones depicted in films aren’t inconceivable. Typically, the origin of science fiction zombies is some contagion or another that is at first brutally fatal, and subsequentially alarming as the person is reincarnated as a cannibal. However, just because something is inconsiderable doesn’t mean that it is likely to happen. Thus, it would be exceedingly imprudent to prepare for a zombie apocalypse, precisely because of its improbability of occurring. What is conceivable isn’t necessarily plausible, and conceivability alone is not enough to bolster an argument. The substantiation of a claim must entail tangible evidence, not merely a supposition of possibility.
What about philosophical zombies? Philosophical zombies are quite different from the standard science fiction zombies in a few important respects. For starters, philosophical zombies are not undead cannibals sprung from a disease outbreak. Rather, philosophical zombies are no different from everyday people in almost all respects. In other words, simply picture a different world out in the universe that resembles Earth in all of its important aspects: a world crowded with a multitude of life forms, each of which bearing resemblance to Earth’s.
The one respect in which they differ, however, is that they lack consciousness. It is a world full of life, but void of any experience. Specifically, philosophical zombies are humans that function and behave in all of the same ways that humans do, but without any experiences of such behaviors or functions. What may the philosophical import of philosophical zombies be?
The philosophical zombie argument
According to New York University philosopher David Chalmers’ book The Conscious Mind, the concept of philosophical zombies threatens what is known in the philosophy of mind as ‘physicalism.’ Physicalism runs counter to the traditional idea that the mind is somehow distinct from the body –a view known as ‘mind-body dualism.’ Mind-body dualism takes it to be the case that the mind is immaterial (i.e., not physical), and the body is material (i.e., physical) and…
