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Dealing With The Gettier Problem

Daniel Lehewych
13 min readDec 3, 2019

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The Gettier problem has stultified the field of epistemology since Edmund Gettier formulated it in his 1963 paper Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? In essence, the Gettier Problem calls into question the validity of the traditional analysis of knowledge. The traditional analysis can be illustrated as follows:

(1) P is true

(2) S believes in P

(3) S has justification for believing P

(4) S knows P

In the traditional analysis, all four components are necessary and sufficient in order for one to be said to have knowledge. Gettier however, alludes to cases where one can hold a justified false belief. This calls into doubt the idea that justification is sufficient for knowledge. Gettier counterexamples -in theory- show that the traditional analysis is not sufficient for prompting a definition of knowledge. This is rooted in the fact that the truthhood of P might change over time. For example, in Gettier’s first example, Smith believes that Jones will get the job because the president of the company assured him that would be the case. The president telling is him this at T1. For all intents and purposes, Smith believes the president. He is justified in believing that Jones will be hired. However, given that the actual outcome was that Smith acquired the position (P) (T2), and this fact was made manifest after the president told Smith otherwise, due to the false — but epistemically responsible, in believing — information at T1, and what the actual truth turned out to be, Smith had a justified false belief. Because Smith’s beliefs were entirely contingent upon the false information given at T1, he cannot be said to have known P. Even with the clause “the man who gets the job, is the man with 10 coins in his pocket” Smith cannot be said to know, because the fact that he himself had 10 coins in his pocket, was unknown to him but the fact that Jones did, was known to him -the latter point, enforcing Smith being justified, but still false. This has left an epistemological void in our understanding of how it is we can say that an individual has knowledge: what is one to do with the traditional analysis in light of the Gettier problem?

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Daniel Lehewych
Daniel Lehewych

Written by Daniel Lehewych

Philosopher | Writer | Bylines: Big Think, Newsweek, PsychCentral

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